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I. INTRODUCTION
Ernest: “Why should the artist be troubled by the shrill clamour of
criticism? Why should those who cannot create take upon them-
selves to estimate the value of creative work? What can they know
about it? If a man’s work is easy to understand, an explanation is
unnecessary . . . .”
Gilbert: “And if his work is incomprehensible, an explanation is
wicked.”1
In the winter of 2008, Richard Prince had a major exhibition of new
and controversial paintings at Gagosian Gallery in New York titled
Canal Zone.2 For the exhibition, Prince, an early member of the ap-
propriationist art group known as The Pictures Generation,3
presented a body of artworks that incorporated reproductions of pub-
lished photographs protected by the United States Copyright Act of
* Sergio Mun˜oz Sarmiento is an artist and art lawyer in private practice. He is
also an adjunct professor of contemporary art and law at Fordham Law School.
Lauren van Haaften-Schick is an independent curator and artist in New York whose
practice concerns the intersection of art, labor, and the law. The Authors would like to
extend their thanks to Julia van Haaften, Curator of Photographs, NYPL
(1980–2001), Assistant Director for Collections, Digital Library Program New York
Public Library (2001–2005), and to independent curator of photography Ronald
Schick, for their thoughtful editing and input regarding the art historical issues raised
in this Article.
1. OSCAR WILDE, The Critic As Artist, in INTENTIONS 105, 113 (1909).
2. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618
(2013).
3. The appropriation artists, or The Pictures Generation, grew to notoriety not
simply through exhibitions but by having a strong following of critics and curators
who wrote extensively about the work. The Pictures exhibition at Artists Space in
New York in 1978 was the first cohesive presentation of this work and was deftly
designed to promote it through touring the show to multiple venues and through ex-
tensive accompanying critical texts produced by its curator Douglas Crimp. The show
was also uniquely sponsored by corporate funding, an anomaly at the time for an
exhibition at a small-scale venue.
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1976.4 The original published photographs were taken by the artist
Patrick Cariou for his book, Yes Rasta, which consisted of a series of
portraits of Rastafarians in Jamaica.5
Upon learning of Prince’s exhibition from a New York art dealer
who was interested in exhibiting Cariou’s Yes Rasta photographs,
Cariou promptly sent a cease-and-desist notice to Gagosian.6 After his
requests were ignored, Cariou filed a lawsuit against Prince and Gago-
sian Gallery in the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, claiming that his photographic works had been
infringed.7 In the initial decision, Judge Deborah A. Batts ruled
strongly in favor of Patrick Cariou, finding that all thirty of Prince’s
paintings were infringing Cariou’s copyrighted photographs.8 Addi-
tionally, Judge Batts granted Cariou full control over the material fate
of the works, ordering the defendants to deliver all infringing copies
of the photographs, the paintings, and unsold copies of the Canal
Zone exhibition book to Cariou for impounding, destruction, or any
other disposition Cariou saw fit.9 Judge Batts also ordered the defend-
ants to send written notices to any current or future owners of the
paintings informing them that Prince’s paintings were not lawfully
made under the Copyright Act of 1976, and therefore these artworks
could not be publicly displayed.10
Prince appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit.11 In a spectacular turnaround, the Second Circuit found
that twenty-five of the thirty works by Prince were fair use, vacating
and reversing the initial ruling in part, and remanding the remaining
five works to Judge Batts for re-evaluation.12
This highly controversial event has become the defining case of cop-
yright infringement and appropriation art of our time, and it leaves us
with difficult questions regarding (1) the elusive definition of that
which is “transformative,” (2) the role judges play as arbiters of taste
when deciding whether the appropriation of copyrighted artistic con-
tent is fair use, (3) what artistic mediums we grant the privileged sta-
tus of high art, and which creators we grant the superior title of artist,
and (4) issues regarding the use and exploitation of artistic intellectual
and material labor. Although the question of artistic medium might
seem outside of the purview of a legal journal, we believe that the
4. Id.
5. Id. at 699. See also Yes Rasta, Photographs by Patrick Cariou, http://www.pat
rickcariou.com/rasbook.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2014).
6. Amended Complaint at 8, Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y.
2011), rev’d in part, vacated in part, 714 F.3d 694 (No. 08 Civ. 11327).
7. Id. at 3.
8. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 342.
9. Id. at 355–56.
10. Id. at 356.
11. Defendant’s Notice of Appeal at 1, Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 342.
12. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 699.
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Second Circuit’s opinion in Cariou highlights the increasing role
judges play as art critics and how such aesthetic-judicial judgments
unfairly and negatively impact cultural production by relegating cer-
tain artists and media, such as photographers and photography respec-
tively, and artists who have not attained great recognition within the
art market, to second-class status.
Cariou is unique in the history of copyright cases involving visual
art for many reasons. First, the case concerns two entire bodies of
work, as opposed to a single sculpture or single photograph as in other
landmark cases such as Rogers v. Koons13 and Blanch v. Koons.14 In
these cases, the specific visual content appropriated could be analyzed
and considered in isolated detail, allowing for closer, more focused,
and more reasoned scrutiny. In Cariou, thirty paintings created by
Prince containing at least forty-one of Cariou’s photographs were in
question and also required the same level of analysis with the same
level of exacting detail, despite the fact that the visual information of
both parties’ artworks is highly varied.
Second, the two parties are both contemporary artists who are ac-
tively exhibiting and selling their work to an art audience. With the
exception of Rogers, most prior copyright infringement cases concern-
ing contemporary visual art involve an artist and a commercial entity,
such as an advertising firm or commercial photographer, whose prod-
uct has an obvious commercial purpose, allowing for a clearer deter-
mination of the first and fourth fair-use factors, which respectively
consider the purpose and character of the appropriating work as well
as the market harm to the copyright holder.15
Third, the Second Circuit’s descriptions of the two artists and their
respective practices, as stated in the written opinion, reveal a clear
favoritism for the traditionally privileged genre of painting as well as
designating monetary value as the prime measure of cultural value.
13. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
14. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
15. This is not to say that contemporary art and all its machinations is not a com-
mercial enterprise—far from it. Art schools, private and public museums, art galleries,
art fairs, art journals and magazines, and artists largely aim for and see success in the
art world as being intricately tied to commercial and financial success. For more on art
and its imbrication with celebrity life, fashion, and its increasing growth as a commer-
cial business enterprise, see MARTHA BUSKIRK, CREATIVE ENTERPRISE: CONTEMPO-
RARY ART BETWEEN MUSEUM AND MARKETPLACE 201–62 (2012). “That system of
social and professional activity has continued to expand in proportion to contempo-
rary art’s economic significance, as the idea that there might be money to be made
investing in recent work is linked to expanded professional support systems and the
increased importance of high-profile celebrity artists.” Id. See also ISABELLE GRAW,
HIGH PRICE: ART BETWEEN THE MARKET AND CELEBRITY CULTURE 65 (2009). “In
comparison to other markets, the art market is obviously special, being defined as it is
by the sale of specific goods. The distinctive quality of this market is thus founded on
the specificity of its product (‘art’). In the compound concept ‘art market,’ ‘art’ and
‘market’ are directly related to one another in a way that pushes the aspect of art’s
marketability into the foreground.” Id. (emphasis in original).
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This flawed logic employed by the Second Circuit raises crucial ques-
tions concerning the definitions of transformative use, and the exclu-
sion of certain mediums and socio-economic classes of artists from
being granted a legitimate participation in the construction of art, or
art history, and the application of law to contemporary art practices.
Lastly, the Second Circuit’s strong privileging of Prince, the artist
with celebrity status and a higher financial position, raises concerns
regarding the implied and greater right to copy that this position
grants him. Artists, curators, and art critics have largely sided with
Prince and have cheered the Second Circuit decision, despite the fact
that their professional and economic positions are more akin to that of
Cariou. The case is therefore also exemplary of the dangerous cultural
turn towards the blurring of celebrity culture and contemporary art, a
shared disregard of copyright law and its enforcement, and of the
abandonment of intellectual property rights as a labor issue for artists
within a platform in favor of artists’ rights.
II. SPECTACLE AS FAIR USE
In the appellate court’s decision, Cariou is described as a profes-
sional photographer who spent over six years traveling to Jamaica de-
veloping friendships with and photographing a Rastafarian
community.16 His works are self-described as “extreme classical pho-
tography [and] portraiture” not resembling or referencing pop cul-
ture.17 In 2000, Power House Books published Yes Rasta, a
comprehensive book of the photographs.18 The Second Circuit’s de-
tails of Cariou’s publication are quite misleading, articulating that
“[l]ike many, if not most, such works, the book enjoyed limited com-
mercial success,” and stating that although over three-quarters of the
publication’s first print run of 7,000 had sold to date, “over sixty per-
cent . . . sold below the suggested retail price of sixty dollars.”19 The
Second Circuit adds that Cariou received “just over $8,000” from the
royalties of this book, and had sold only four photographic prints from
the series, all to friends and relatives.20 The Second Circuit’s descrip-
tion is not that of an established artist or a culturally respected artist,
but rather an unfounded and prejudicial description of a failed artist
16. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 699.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. The Authors question what factual evidence was reviewed by the Second
Circuit when assessing and opining that “many, if not most,” books “like” Cariou’s
enjoy limited commercial success. The Authors also wonder why commercial success
in the field of art is seen as sine qua non to determining whether the copyrighted
underlying work is “successful” or worthy of copyright protection.
20. Id. It is of import to note that such figures are in fact typical, if not on the
higher end of sales, of photography books in general and for documentary art works
in particular. This observation has been stated in numerous conversations between
the Authors and professionals in the art book publishing industry.
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or successful hobbyist, perhaps producing images, but not of a stature
that the Second Circuit recognizes as high art.
In profound contrast, the Second Circuit introduces Prince as a
“well-known appropriation artist.”21 His work “has involved taking
photographs and other images that others have produced and incorpo-
rating them into paintings and collages that he then presents, in a dif-
ferent context, as his own.”22 Prince is described as a leading figure
within appropriation and has exhibited his work in museums around
the world.23 The Second Circuit adds that Prince’s work is owned by
major collections and that guests at the dinner for the exhibit hosted
by Gagosian Gallery included celebrities and famous musicians such
as Jay-Z, Beyonce Knowles, Brad Pitt, Angelina Jolie, and Robert
DeNiro, as well as professional football player Tom Brady and Vogue
editor Anna Wintour.24 Prince sold eight artworks from the Canal
Zone series for a total of $10,480,000 and exchanged seven others for
works by canonical artists such as painter Larry Rivers and sculptor
Richard Serra.25 With this collection of selective facts, the Second Cir-
cuit positions Prince—and the spectacle of Prince—as the epitome of
success in contemporary art.26
The distinctions drawn by this comparison are crucial in an analysis
of Cariou’s claim against Prince, and of the appellate court’s decision.
By invoking a certain type of institutional recognition27, monetary
worth of the art works, and the celebrity allure and lifestyle associated
with contemporary art, the Second Circuit traces an image of commer-
cial, elitist culture, and pop-cultural value and, therefore, legitimizing,
through the application of U.S. Copyright Law, Richard Prince and
his appropriative practices while painting Patrick Cariou as a lower-
class amateur. With these class and categorical distinctions of the artist
and amateur in place, the Second Circuit has not only dismissed
Cariou’s claim as a legitimate author and artist, but more perniciously,
the court does not address Cariou’s well-founded copyright infringe-
ment claims in a serious, objective, and rational manner. Furthermore,
the Second Circuit lays down a disturbing foundation and premise
that artists who do not obtain—or even seek—commercial or spectac-
ular successes at the hands of the art market and Hollywood-style ce-
lebrity culture should resign themselves to becoming feeders of ideas




24. Id. at 709.
25. Id.
26. See generally BUSKIRK, supra note 15.
27. See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 699. The Second Circuit, sua sponte, elevates Prince’s
art historical value and status by proclaiming that Prince is “a leading exponent of
[appropriation] and his work has been displayed in museums around the world[,]” and
then continuing on to list several national and international museums. Id.
946 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1
tions. In effect, the Second Circuit confirms and validates that Prince’s
financial success within the art establishment grants him a greater and
more valid claim to a fair use defense, original authorship status,28 as
well as preferential treatment by a federal court.
III. JUDGES AS ART CRITICS
The Second Circuit continued by comparing the aesthetic, material
and physical specifics of each artist’s body of work. The court details
the physical make-up of the respective artists’ art works: Cariou’s Yes
Rasta is a book of photographs measuring approximately 9.5’’ x 12’’.29
Prince’s artworks, in contrast, “comprise inkjet printing and acrylic
paint, as well as pasted-on elements, and are several times that
size . . . . The smallest of the Prince artworks measures 40’’ x 30’’, or
approximately ten times as large as each page of Yes Rasta.”30 Prince’s
works are visually compelling, “hectic and provocative,” the court
writes, while Cariou’s are “serene and deliberately composed.”31
Prince’s works are gestural, colorful, and thick in their use of painterly
material. Cariou’s photographs are small, intimate, and contemplative.
In the Second Circuit opinion, Prince’s physical technique is de-
scribed, but importantly, Cariou’s is not. His method was, however,
discussed by Judge Batts in the district court opinion, where she ex-
plained that Cariou’s use of photography is specific and learned, exe-
cuted using a medium format camera and requiring a mastery of
darkroom technique.32 Why does the Second Circuit ignore the re-
quired knowledge and application of photographic techniques?
Other issues of import raised by Judge Batts include Prince’s lack of
artistic intent and justification for his use of Cariou’s copyrighted pho-
tographs of Rastafarians.33 In his testimony, Prince repeatedly evaded
the questions of Cariou’s lawyers. The primary reason given by Prince
for using the Yes Rasta images was that he simply wanted to change
them and make them look “new.”34 This was the key factor of the
28. See DOUGLAS EKLUND, THE PICTURES GENERATION: 1974-1984, at 111, 166
(2009). This is ironic given that The Pictures Generation group, of which Prince is
considered a seminal figure, articulated a position based on dismantling the romanti-
cized notion of the author and single-author figure. This group helped propel certain
French thinkers who argued against authorship and artistic intent.
29. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 700.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 706.
32. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 343.
33. Id. at 349. Section 107(1) of the U.S. Copyright Act prescribes that the pur-
pose and character of the secondary use should be assessed. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
§ 107(1) (2012). Under this Section, the basic question for an appropriation artist is
“Why are you using the copyrighted work and how are you using it?” Under the
“why” and “how” of this question, artistic intent is patently obvious, and the need to
have the appropriating artist articulate answers, or an answer, to the “why” and
“how” is extremely important in analyzing a fair use defense.
34. Id.
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district court’s opinion in favor of Cariou, arguing that in order to be
considered fair use, a secondary work must directly comment upon
the work(s) appropriated.35 The Second Circuit found this a false as-
sumption and determined that a transformative work need not refer
to the original copyrighted work, but may instead be transformative to
the “reasonable observer” who determines transformativeness on the
basis of visual similarities and differences:36 in other words, a work
may qualify as transformative on the basis of perceived aesthetics. As
such, the Second Circuit’s opinion is dependent on size and look, as-
pects of the artwork that are favored over concept, artistic intent, exe-
cution, and content. The Second Circuit does not detail who this
“reasonable observer” is and, given that in the Authors’ experiences
most copyright claims are resolved at the summary judgment stage or
at trial by a district court judge, the Second Circuit eviscerated the
United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho-
graphing Co.37 by mandating that trial and appellate judges under
their jurisdiction approach visual-art copyright lawsuits as art critics
and arbiters of taste, and not necessarily as judges in a court of law.
However, there is some highly relevant criticism in the dissent’s opin-
ion that correctly counters the majority’s erroneous opinion.
In his dissent of the Second Circuit’s majority opinion, Judge Clif-
ford Wallace, sitting by designation from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, rightly argues that “after correcting an
erroneous legal standard employed by the district court, we would re-
mand for reconsideration.”38 However, he goes on to note, “the ma-
jority short-circuits this time-tested search for a just result under the
law.”39 Furthermore, Judge Wallace questions the majority’s insis-
tence on analyzing only the visual similarities and differences between
Cariou’s and Prince’s art works, “Unlike the majority, I would allow
35. Id. at 349–50.
36. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 707.
37. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). In this
seminal case for the visual arts, Justice Holmes articulates:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some
works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty
would make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in
which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance,
whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been
sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright
would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than
the judge. Yet if they command the interest of any public, they have a com-
mercial value—it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and
educational value—and the taste of any public is not to be treated with
contempt.
Id. at 251–52.
38. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 712.
39. Id.
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the district court to consider Prince’s statements reviewing fair
use. . . . I see no reason to discount Prince’s statements as the majority
does.”40 In fact, Judge Wallace remarks that he views Prince’s state-
ments as “relevant to the transformativeness analysis.”41 Judge Wal-
lace does not believe that a simple visual side-by-side analysis is
enough because this would call for judges to “employ [their] own ar-
tistic judgment[s].”42
Judge Wallace cites Bleistein and agrees that judges should not em-
ploy their own artistic judgments but rather allow for more eviden-
tiary material in order to best assess a fair use defense.43 In fact,
Wallace adds that the additional evidentiary material should not be
assessed by an appellate court but rather should be remanded to the
district court: “I, for one, do not believe that I am in a position to
make these fact- and opinion-intensive decisions on the twenty-five
works that passed the majority’s judicial observation. . . . nor am I
trained to make art opinions ab initio.”44 Why then does the Second
Circuit decide to make artistic judgments and how does it decide that
only twenty-five of thirty paintings are fair use? Why not remand the
entire thirty paintings to the lower court and let a trier of fact decide?
IV. PRIVILEGED MEDIUMS
This reliance on purely visual information leads us to trace the his-
tory of the cultural value that has been granted or denied to photo-
graphic images. Photographs, though recognized as being capable of
serving as both primary and secondary information and as both ex-
pressive and documentary, are still at times given second-tier-status to
other forms of art (primarily painting), both within the art world and
courts of law.
In analyzing fair use, the nature of the source material and purpose
of the appropriated use are key determinants, and photography, as
both a technical and artistic medium, has a complicated history with
regard to copyright. At the foundation of copyright law, an idea can-
not be copyrighted, only certain physical manifestations that meet the
requirements of the Copyright Act 1976.45 The copyright to a photo-
graph, and all other protected forms, also protects the right of the
original author to produce derivative works. As legal scholar Rebecca
Tushnet notes, in order to find that photographs are copyrightable,
courts had to determine and allow for the possibility that photographs
could be authored, thereby emphasizing expression rather than mere
40. Id. at 713.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 714.
44. Id.
45. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012): “In no case does copyright pro-
tection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea . . . .”
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re-presentation of the world.46 In a court of law, Tushnet writes, pho-
tographs appear in two roles.47 In one capacity, they must be inter-
preted as possessing factual evidence.48 In their other role, they must
be read as the product of an artistic act.49 Photographs must always be
capable of either function.
Within the history of art, photography’s inherent capability as a tool
for recording the factual world has resulted in persistent debate over
its (high) status as art or (low) status as documentation.50 As John
Szarkowski, former director of the Department of Photography at the
Museum of Modern Art in New York has explained, the difference
between painting and photography was a basic one: “Paintings were
made . . . but photographs, as the man on the street puts it, were
taken.”51 Art historian Douglas Crimp has paired this assertion by
Szarkowski with modernist photographer Ansel Adams’s claim: “The
common term ‘taking a picture’ is more than just an idiom; it is a
symbol of exploitation. ‘Making a picture’ implies a creative
resonance which is essential to profound expression.”52 Crimp ex-
plains that these statements are not in opposition to one another, but
serve as evidence of the ontological shift that occurred with regard to
photography that allowed for it to be viewed as “a medium of [an
artist’s] subjectivity,” enabling it to duplicate the “theories of modern-
ist autonomy articulated earlier in [the twentieth] century for paint-
ing.” This shift also allowed for photographs to circulate and
participate within an art market and to be held in an art museum as
the creative work of an artist, rather than as a document or record.53
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, collecting libraries and museums
began re-categorizing, or cross-categorizing, items that beforehand
had only been indexed as documentation under the classification of
46. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125
HARV. L. REV. 684, 714 (2012).
47. See id. at 714–715.
48. See id. at 715.
49. Id.
50. ALLAN SEKULA, ON THE INVENTION OF PHOTOGRAPHIC MEANING 5–6 (1974).
Writing on the relationship between photography and high art, Sekula explains: “The
problem at hand is one of sign emergence; only by developing a historical understand-
ing of the emergence of photographic sign systems can we apprehend the truly con-
ventional nature of photographic communication. We need historically grounded
sociology of the image, both in the valorized realm of high art and in the culture at
large. What follows is an attempt to define, in historical terms, the relationship be-
tween photography and high art.” Id.
51. John Szarkowski, Introduction to the Photographer’s Eye, in PENINAH R. PE-
TRUCK, THE CAMERA VIEWED: WRITINGS ON TWENTIETH-CENTURV PHOTOGRAPHY
203 (New York, E. R Dutton, 1979).
52. Ansel Adams, A Personal Credo, in AMERICAN ANNUAL OF PHOTOGRAPHY
58, at 16 (1948).
53. DOUGLAS CRIMP, ON THE MUSEUM’S RUINS 72 (1993).
950 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1
fine art.54 For example, images by the early expeditionary photogra-
phers Francis Frith55 and Maxime du Camp56 that had previously been
contained within books as visual documentation of travel and urban
subjects were now catalogued as individual images, naming the pho-
tographer as the author, and elevating their status not only to that of
an author, but more so, to that of an artist.57 According to Crimp, this
shift reduced photography from its inherent plurality to instead be
viewed as an aesthetic, singular medium, subsumed by its new status
as art, a process that denied the potential and history of photographs
to exist as either record or as expression.58 However, this elevation of
photography to the status of art also enabled it to disrupt the strict
formal categories of modernism, the very ethos of which was built in
part upon defining the boundaries between original, as opposed to re-
productive media: painting, sculpture, drawing, ceramics, and so forth.
As such, we might see this new acceptance of photography as art as
allowing for an elevation of an artwork’s documentary function as
well, an outcome Crimp does not recognize, but which is evident in
the contemporary art landscape. It is precisely because they fulfill the
crucially pluralistic capacity within the photographic medium that Pat-
rick Cariou’s photographs of Rastafarians fall within the paradigm of
art, as do the equally documentary and fine art photographs of artists
Catherine Opie, Larry Clark, Allan Sekula, LaToya Ruby Frazier, and
Robert Mapplethorpe, whose images are well regarded for their tech-
nical ability, aesthetic value, and documentation of social, political,
cultural, and economic dynamics.
At the same time that photography was gaining credibility by insti-
tutions as an art form, it was also employed heavily by conceptual
artists as a tool for documenting their temporal or immaterial works,
presenting a further complication between the relationship of the ar-
tistic or expressionistic versus documentary functions of photography.
Art historian Alexander Alberro has argued that this documentation,
or secondary information, came to supplant the artworks themselves,
as the photograph, both a promotional and documentary tool, often
served as the only record that a temporary, multi-part and scattered,
or site-specific performative work had ever been perceptibly real-
54. Importantly, this new categorization was a shift in access point, though their
cataloguing information expanded to include both information on the author and on
the subject, so that they might be found as both works of art and as documentary
images. See Susan Pinson, Recollection: A Note from the Curator, N.Y. PUB. LIBR.
(2010), http://exhibitions.nypl.org/recollection/curator_note.html. Pinson was Assis-
tant Director and The Miriam and Ira D. Wallach Librarian for Art, Prints and Photo-
graphs, and The Robert B. Menschel Curator of Photography. Id.
55. See, e.g., FRANCIS FRITH, EGYPT AND PALESTINE (1858).
56. See, e.g., MAXIME DU CAMP, E´GYPTE, NUBIE, PALESTINE ET SYRIE (1852).
57. See Pinson, supra note 54.
58. CRIMP, supra note 53, at 72–73. While Crimp fails to explore the full implica-
tions of this cross-categorization, he is right to assess that the category of greater
privilege subsumed others.
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ized.59 Famously built on such dictums as Lawrence Weiner’s “The
piece need not be built,”60 or Sol Lewitt’s declaration “The idea is the
machine that creates the art,”61 conceptual art strived to create a more
“democratic” form of art that would circulate more freely and that
would be able to be comprised of any material, including the immate-
rial.62 For these artists, the idea was privileged over material and man-
ifestation, for the former was necessary in determining the latter, and
a tangible or visible realization was perhaps irrelevant. While the con-
cept remained at the core of each of these works, their accompanying
photographs are required for exhibition and circulation; the choice of
how and what to photograph for memory and record is an artistic one.
As a result, this documentary material as secondary information be-
came inseparable from and therefore elevated to the status of primary
information, or the art itself. In other words, these photographic docu-
ments became synonymous with the artwork, once again collapsing
the documentary and artistic role of the photograph, and merging the
positions of artist and photographer.63
However, it was not until the end of the twentieth century that pho-
tographs would begin to fetch the high auction prices of other contem-
porary artworks. Andreas Gursky’s 99 cent II and Rhine II set auction
records for photographs in both 2006 and again in 2011, respectively,
59. ALEXANDER ALBERRO, CONCEPTUAL ART AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLICITY
73 (2003).
60. See id. at 97.
61. Id. at 35.
62. For example, Robert Barry’s Inert Gas Series of 1969 exists today as a nearly
blank poster announcing one of the events, and a photograph of the outdoor locations
to which various tanks of gasses were transported and their contents released into the
atmosphere. Id. at 118. Douglas Huebler’s many Location Pieces of the late 1960s–70s
consist of points where the artist had left various objects around urban spaces or
along roads, or collected and displaced found material, and are recorded primarily
through photographs of each spot or marker, with accompanying text identifying the
location. Id. at 77.
63. Both modernist photography and conceptual art made few attempts at engag-
ing images in popular culture or the use of photography by the media, where an au-
thorial or artist role is less pronounced and seldom asserted. Beginning in the mid-to-
late 1970s, there emerged an academic discourse of critical theory and visual culture
and with it a generation of artists creating works using familiar images from popular
culture and the history of art, or mimicking their tropes, often to the effect of in-
serting one’s own name and status as author on top of a known or already publicly
available image. The terms of original authorship were further complicated by flatten-
ing hierarchical divides between high and low cultural products, for, considered as a
whole, these artists gave equal treatment to Hollywood films, advertisements, and
fine art photography, as in Sherrie Levine’s re-photographing of modernist photogra-
phy masters Walker Evans, Karl Blossfeldt, and others, or Douglas Gordon’s 24 hour
Psycho, in which the infamous Hitchcock film is slowed down to fill the duration of an
entire day. Richard Prince’s first acclaimed body of work, known as the Marlboro
Men, also displayed this strategy, as they consisted of cropped and enlarged images of
the cowboys depicted in the eponymous cigarette company’s then well-known
advertisements.
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the second selling for over $4 million at Christie’s in New York.64 Pic-
tures Generation artist Cindy Sherman held the previous highest auc-
tion record for a photograph, selling for $3.9 million, and one of
Prince’s Marlboro Men is close behind.65 These record prices for pho-
tography have been interpreted as the ultimate confirmation that the
medium is now taken seriously by the art world.66 It should be clear
by now that an artistic act incorporating the photographic medium
and technology should no longer be seen as subservient, either aes-
thetically or commercially, to the medium of painting. In fact, the Sec-
ond Circuit does a major disservice to Patrick Cariou by assuming that
Cariou’s photographs could never sell at similar levels as that of Gur-
sky and Sherman.
The reinforcement of the hierarchy of mediums outlined in the Sec-
ond Circuit’s decision leaves us no better off than Crimp’s initial dis-
comfort with the potential loss of photography’s inherent and crucial
plurality. Under this assessment, in the process of adopting
postmodernism’s inclusive “and” with regard to the media, sources,
and topics referenced and used in art, we have abandoned what might
have been valuable within modernism’s exclusionary “or,” or singular-
ity of media, that has made possible the new privileging of mediums,
like photography, that have in the past been relegated to a second-tier
status, giving them at least the same status granted to anything else we
call art. However, the Second Circuit’s reliance on outdated and un-
fortunate assumptions regarding the hierarchy of mediums might lead
us to believe that sociologist Howard Becker’s pessimistic posit holds
true, that “some members of a society can control the application of
the honorific term art, so not everyone is in a position to have the
advantages associated with it.”67
V. CELEBRITY FETISH AND ARTISTIC LABOR
The district court ruling in favor of Cariou was feared by many in
the art world as having a “chilling effect” over artists and art institu-
tions.68 Museums worried that the ruling would prevent them from
being able to acquire or exhibit any works that might contain infring-
64. See Contemporary Art Part I 16 Nov. 2006, 7pm New York, PHILLIPS http://
www.phillips.com/auctions/auction/NY010506 (last visited Mar. 26, 2014); Sale 2480,
Lot 44, CHRISTIE’S http://www.christies.com/lotfinder/photographs/andreas-gursky-
rhein-ii-5496716-details.aspx (last visited Mar. 26, 2014). Auction results are noted as
art market indices because they provide the only publicly available sales figures.
65. Sale 2440, Lot 6, CHRISTIE’S (last visited Mar. 27, 2014); Sale 1834, Lot 71,
CHRISTIE’S (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
66. OLAV VELTHUIS, TALKING PRICES 169 (2005).
67. See HOWARD BECKER, ART WORLDS 34, 37 (1982).
68. See Julia Halperin, Is Prince v. Cariou Already Having a Chilling Effect? Con-
temporary Artists Speak, ARTINFO.COM (Jan. 2, 2012), http://www.blouinartinfo.com/
print/node/758352.
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ing material.69 Artists, many of whom regularly use appropriated im-
agery, became concerned that Judge Batts’s decision could place
restrictions on their artistic practices.70 This chilling-effect “red scare”
was fomented not only by art bloggers and art critics lacking any legal
knowledge, but also by art lawyers with inadequate knowledge of
modern and contemporary art.
Yet these fears and concerns failed to take into account what Judge
Batts clearly described: Prince’s works were “commercial” due to
their aggressive marketing and high price.71 In addition, Judge Batts’s
initial district court ruling did not make any claim that a justification
of fair use was impossible—the decision simply noted that the use
must be done with intent, purpose, and reason, or in other words, that
the appropriator must have a strong conceptual reason for using the
underlying copyrighted work.72 It is clear that meeting the require-
ments of fair use under Judge Batts’s “test,” in both its strict and loose
interpretations, is feasible. Given the above, why was the artistic com-
munity so overwhelmingly in support of Richard Prince?
Over the course of the six years since the Cariou case began, it
would be safe to say that the majority of artists and art critics have
sided with Richard Prince, despite the fact that their own actual social
and economic positions within this milieu more closely resemble that
of Patrick Cariou. By identifying with Prince, there is a desire to asso-
ciate oneself as participating within and belonging to the same upper
tier of the art world hierarchy and its accompanying connotations of
wealth, success, power and celebrity.73 As Isabel Graw has noted,
while in the 1970s Warhol found his artistic reputation damaged by
appearing in fashion glossies alongside the high-fashion jet set, today
artists are quite at home and encouraged to participate in these set-
tings.74 Art has, in fact, permeated and been permeated by celebrity
culture. As with the privileging of the role of the (successful) artist,
celebrities tend to be treated as special beings who operate on the
periphery of society and are viewed as ideals, throwing their life on
69. Id.
70. A recent College Art Association report notes, albeit with a high-degree of
selectivity and fear-mongering: “This issues report reveals a situation in which uncer-
tainty about copyright law and the availability of fair use, particularly in the digital
era, has made many practitioners risk-averse, too often abandoning or distorting
projects due to real or perceived challenges in using copyrighted materials.” See Janet
Landay, CAA Publishes Fair Use Issues Report, CAA (Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.col
legeart.org/news/2014/01/29/caa-publishes-fair-use-issues-report/, (Full report: College
Art Association, Copyright, Permissions, and Fair Use among Visual Artists and the
Academic and Museum Arts Communities: An Issue Report, February 2014).
71. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d in part, va-
cated in part, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). The Appellate Court agrees that Prince’s
works are “no doubt” commercial in nature.
72. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
73. See generally BECKER, supra note 67, at 28–39.
74. GRAW, supra note 15, at 94.
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the market, and at all moments, performing their role. As Graw con-
tinues, the celebrity figure is also an allegory for the sort of competi-
tive environment embodied by the art world.75 While The Pictures
Generation was at one point seen as the antidote to the celebrity styl-
ings of Neo-Expressionist Julian Schnabel, and the pop Warhol, today
the complete absorption of the art market into celebrity fetish and
culture—and vice versa—has rendered the most successful artists of
this era complicit with this turn.76
Today, it is commonplace, encouraged even, for participants within
the professional art world to receive acknowledgement as important
public figures, but not necessarily for the weight of their ideas, criti-
ques or concepts, but rather for the value of their social networks and
for the cultural value they have acquired.77 As Pierre Bourdieu has
famously explained, such “cultural capital” is capable of bringing
monetary capital, but this equation is not a given.78 An increasingly
stratified art economy has unsurprisingly resulted in a rise in precari-
ous cultural labor. At the same time, the importance of one’s “net-
works” becomes ever important, as exposure and affiliation may lead
to the opportunities so desperately sought after. The ascendency of art
in the social and mainstream media, and its grouping with celebrity,
may be linked in large part to the myth of inclusion it promotes. Ac-
cording to Graw, herein lies the appeal of art in the popular press and
explains the privileging of artists and artworks that leave us wanting
for critical content. In this view of the artist, they appear as someone
who has “won it all” simply by knowing where to be at the right
75. Id. at 75.
76. Kira Cochrane, Cindy Sherman Models for MAC, the Makeup Company of
Outsiders, THE GUARDIAN, July 31, 2011, available at http://www.theguardian.com/
lifeandstyle/2011/jul/31/cindy-sherman-mac-makeup-fashion. See also Leigh Silver,
Jay-Z Is Rapping to Marina Abramovic at Pace Gallery, COMPLEX (July 10, 2013),
http://www.complex.com/art-design/2013/07/jay-z-is-rapping-to-marina-abramovic-at-
pace-gallery/ (feminist performance artist Marina Abramovic’s collaboration with
rapper, Jay-Z); Robert Johnson, Louis Vuitton: The Art of Art, GQ BRITISH (July 12,
2011), http://www.gq-magazine.co.uk/entertainment/articles/2012-07/11/louis-vuitton-
art-fashion-takashi-murakami-grayson-perry (Takashi Murakami’s, Jeff Koons’s, and
Damien Hirst’s collaborations with Louis Vuitton).
77. With this, the art market has learned to utilize art criticism as a tool for creat-
ing the appearance of intellectual value in an artwork where there is, in fact, very
little. As noted by Diana Crane, the over-production of critical texts around an art-
work and an art movement can grant it a historic weight that is not necessarily
equivalent to the intellectual value of its concepts. DIANA CRANE, THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF THE AVANT-GARDE: THE NEW YORK ART WORLD 1940–1985, at 37 (1989).
Isabelle Graw has noted that Gagosian Gallery in particular is no stranger to this, as
they routinely produce monographs on newly represented artists that feature writing
by some of the most prominent art historians and critics of the time, regardless of
whether the work has been held in high intellectual regard prior to these efforts,
thereby instrumentalizing the critic and the art historian in the marketing of art. See
GRAW, supra note 74. It should come as no surprise that, in the contemporary art
world, writers are often in the most precarious of labor positions.
78. Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RE-
SEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241–58 (J. Richardson ed., 1986).
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time.79 This is an everyman tale, but it is also a dangerous fantasy. This
association with celebrity fables divorces our conception of the artist
from their real labor and leads us to believe that any success obtained
is the product of luck, charm, or myth as opposed to real struggle, and
therefore, that the labor of art is really not very much work at all.
The other side of this support in favor of Prince is the discourse of
“free culture” that seeks to defend the free dissemination and access
to cultural products by any means possible. The principles of free cul-
ture rooted in the open access to non-copyrighted works, educative,
government, and publicly funded materials are, of course, worthy of
defense. However, the unfortunate oversight in an argument of en-
tirely unrestricted access to all cultural production ignores the fact
that under this system, cultural producers are not paid for their work.
Arguments in favor of complete free culture are most troubling when
expressed by artists themselves, as in doing so they fail to identify
themselves as potentially vulnerable to any unwanted taking of their
own work and do not consider the personal financial loss that results
from the denial of reproduction or licensing fees. The benefit of li-
censing fees is that they enable artists to monetize their intellectual
and creative production as any other actual or tangible property,
thereby allowing artists to profit, though often modestly, from their
work. David Lowery, member of the indie rock band Camper Van
Beethoven, has written extensively on the lack of licensing fees paid
to contemporary musicians and on the shift in our shared ethics that
now lead us to expect to own cultural production, such as art and mu-
sic, without paying for it.80 Lowery writes, “The accepted norm for
hundreds of years of western civilization is that the artist exclusively
has the right to exploit and control his/her work for a period of
time. . . . Now we are being asked to undo this not because we think
this is a bad or unfair way to compensate artists but simply because it
is technologically possible for corporations or individuals to exploit
artists’ work without their permission . . . .”81 Today, Lowery argues,
there has been a shift in our principles and morality regarding the
question of who gets to exploit and control the work of an artist.82 As
a result, the ideal previously held highly among artists, and the general
79. GRAW, supra note 15. Such images of ascendency to a high social class from
working class upbringings, and of gaining a voice in forming cultural or national iden-
tity are things to which we generally aspire. The appeal of these narratives has also
proven easy to exploit.
80. Scott Timberg, David Lowery: Silicon Valley Must be Stopped, or Creativity
Will be Destroyed, SALON (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/12/04/david_low
ery_silicon_valley_must_be_stopped_or_creativity_will_be_destroyed/.
81. David Lowery, Letter to Emily White at NPR All Songs Considered, THE
TRICHORDIST (June 18, 2012), http://thetrichordist.com/2012/06/18/letter-to-emily-
white-at-npr-all-songs-considered/.
82. Id.
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public, that artists should have the rights to control the use and mone-
tization of their work have largely been abandoned.83
An important historic observation to note is that the current Copy-
right Act of 1976 appeared soon after the emergence of conceptual art
and that in the preceding decade, many artist activists included copy-
rights within a platform of improved labor rights for artists.84 Such
reproduction rights, and the fees they provided to artists, were once
viewed as a crucial labor issues among artists, as exemplified in the
protests of the Art Workers Coalition (AWC) and affiliated groups,
who placed the enforcement of copyrights and reproduction rights as
central to a platform of activism in favor of improved labor conditions
for art workers.85 During the AWC’s Open Hearing of April 1969, Sol
Lewitt demanded that “the museum, collector, or publication . . . com-
pensate the artist for use of his art,” a point that was echoed in numer-
ous other statements.86 A flyer for a subsequent protest at the
Museum of Modern Art called for the institution to pay artists a
residual on all reproductions of the artists’ works.87 Notably, these de-
mands were addressed to art institutions and not to fellow artists.
However, given Prince and Gagosian’s stature as institutions within
the commercial art world, as both Judge Batts and the Second Circuit
admitted,88 we might reconsider Lewitt and the AWC’s arguments as
applicable to these high-status actors as well.
Many of these activists were also conceptual artists, Lewitt and Wei-
ner prominently among them. These artists’ use of certificates of au-
thenticity and resale rights contracts89 served to impart a level of
authorship above and beyond that of a signature on a page or in the
corner of a painting, yet did not negate any attempts to formulate a
more “democratic” notion of art. Rather, their logic and reasoning
speaks to the original (or ideal) purpose of copyright law in the
United States: to encourage the creation of art and culture by re-
warding authors and artists with a set of exclusive rights. These rights
over the reproduction of one’s work are fundamental to a conception
of labor rights for artists. As conceptual art’s mission lay in the pro-
duction of ideas recorded in easily transmitted and often reproducible
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Art Workers’ Coalition, Open Hearing (1969), available at http://pri
maryinformation.org/files/FOH.pdf.
85. See id.; Art Workers’ Coalition, Documents 1 (1969), available at http://prima
ryinformation.org/files/FDoc.pdf.
86. Art Workers’ Coalition, supra note 84, at 59.
87. Art Workers’ Coalition Flyer, 1969, ARCHIVES AM. ART, http://www.aaa.si
.edu/collections/images/detail/art-workers-coalition-flyer-10136 (last visited Mar. 29,
2014).
88. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d in part, va-
cated in part, 714 F.3d 694, 709 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013).
89. See generally ROBERT PROJANSKY & SETH SIEGELAUB, THE ARTIST’S RE-
SERVED RIGHTS TRANSFER AND SALE AGREEMENT (1971).
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formats—such as photography—we can understand why conceptual
art’s concern regarding copyright as a labor right was paramount.90
Similar to art exhibition or performance fees, image reproduction
fees are a means of compensating artists at a small but potentially
steady pace, and in addition to the benefit of financial recognition of
labor, the fees serve to treat artistic labor as equivalent to any other
legitimate form of work. In the case of Cariou, the abusive use of
Cariou’s images by Richard Prince can be equated with any other in-
stance of the exploitation of artistic labor.
VI. CONCLUSION
Considering the above, we can conclude that the Second Circuit’s
decision in Cariou is indicative of the pernicious continued stratifica-
tion of the mediums and producers of art, and the enforcement of
hierarchies of economic class and cultural value. The upper tiers of the
art world cater to celebrity culture to an unprecedented extent, creat-
ing a condition where the most visible venues of art are no longer
beholden to their critics, but vie instead for attention by the popular
media and sales of admission tickets or works of art.91 With this lack
of any popular basis for critical consideration, it is almost no surprise
that the judicial evaluation of fair use would be reduced to a formalist
analysis of pure image, merely considering what comprises the sur-
face, rather than paying heed to the facts as they stand. Patrick
Cariou’s plight is no different than that of the artist who must spend
months chasing a token exhibition fee; a writer who is continually
asked to write criticism for zero or little compensation;92 or an artist
whose painting is appropriated as a textile design and then produced
and sold by a major fashion brand;93 these are all unfortunately typical
scenarios, as is the position argued by Patrick Cariou.
90. A current equivalent to the positions of the Art Workers Coalition is found in
the New York based artist-activist group Working Artists for the Greater Economy,
who have proposed a schedule of artist fees that should be paid by organizations
hosting art exhibitions.
91. Note Tilda Swinton’s performance, The Maybe, at the Museum of Modern
Art, NY, 2013; James Franco exhibition at Pace Gallery, NY, 2014; Bob Dylan exhibi-
tion at Gagosian Gallery, NY, 2013; and the Shia LaBeouf exhibition at the Cohen
Gallery in Los Angeles, CA, 2014.
92. Tim Kreider, Slaves of the Internet—Unite!, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2013, at SR1.
93. Did Delia’s Rip Off Andrew Jeffrey Wright?, PHILEBRITY.COM (Apr. 2, 2009),
http://www.philebrity.com/2009/04/02/did-delias-rip-off-andrew-jeffrey-wright/.
